From Scars to Melody

The evolution of the Chinese film industry since the 1970s reflects a dynamic interplay between political oversight, cultural identity and globalisation. After the Cultural Revolution, a new generation of filmmakers revitalised Chinese cinema, introducing narratives that grappled with historical trauma and embraced authenticity over state propaganda. As China opened its economy to the world in the late 70s, the film industry benefited from international co-productions, importing foreign expertise, and giving domestic directors access to more developed cinematic technologies and resources. Moving into the 21st century, as China joins the World Trade Organisation, the growth of nationalist films signifies China’s ambition to assert its cultural influence on the global stage.

This article explores the key factors that have shaped Chinese cinema since the 1970s—in particular, state regulation, trade policies, and cinematic innovation. I will then examine their influence on directors and their works both within, and outside China.

THE BIRTH OF HOMEGROWN GENRES: 1970s-1990s

Reopening in 1987 after over a decade of closure during the Cultural Revolution, the Beijing Film Academy (BFA) ushered in a new wave of talent known as “the Fifth Generation.” These filmmakers revitalised Chinese cinema, shifting its focus from state messaging to artistic and global acclaim. Directors like Zhang Yimou (To Live, 1994), Chen Kaige (Farewell My Concubine, 1992), and Tian Zhuangzhuang (The Blue Kite, 1993) gained international recognition from Cannes, BAFTA, Tokyo film festivals, and the Academy Awards. The Fifth Generation hailed a vibrant rebirth of Chinese cinema after the Cultural Revolution, during which film was largely used to transmit and reinforce political ideologies­. (1)

These Fifth Generation directors, having come of age during the Cultural Revolution, often drew on its trauma in their films, giving rise to “Scar cinema.” This genre, akin to Italian neorealism, explored the personal, and societal wounds of the period through raw, honest storytelling. (2) Zhang Yimou’s To Live (1994) follows Xu Fugui, a once wealthy man forced to start anew as a shadow puppeteer as his life unfolds amid major political upheavals. Chen Kaige’s Farewell My Concubine chronicles the struggles of two Beijing Opera performers against the backdrop of five decades of Chinese history. Tian Zhuangzhuang’s The Blue Kite captures a family’s trials through the Hundred Flowers Campaign, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution. Through these narratives, post-Mao cinema became a medium for processing trauma, fostering healing, and celebrating the resilience of ordinary Chinese civilians.

Since the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening-up” policies began opening China’s economy to the world, enabling Chinese cinema to enter the world stage. Policies like Document 19—later revised to Document 200 in 2003—allowed co-productions between the China Film Group Corporation (CFCC) and foreign studios. (3) This significantly benefited Chinese directors at the time, as the domestic industry had limited resources compared to more established industries like Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Hollywood. For example, while Chen Kaige’s early work, Yellow Earth(1984), was shot on 16mm film, his later film, Farewell My Concubine (1992), benefited from advanced 35mm equipment and substantial funding from Hong Kong’s Tomson Films, and Taiwan’s Central Motion Picture Corporation (4). These partnerships enabled Chen to execute large-scale productions, including detailed period costumes, extensive location shoots, and vast ensemble casts essential for depicting events like the Cultural Revolution, elevating Chinese cinema’s production value and global reach. (5)

The introduction of co-productions policies also benefited foreign directors. Shaolin Temple (1982), created by Hong Kong director Hsin-yan Chang, and starring Jet Li, was a major box office success in the mainland. Co-produced between the CFCC, Shaw Brothers Studio (Hong Kong) and Xin Xin Film Company, the project benefited from its access to the unsaturated Chinese film market. The film reportedly sold over 410 million tickets across China within the first six-months of its release, (6) yielding more than 160 million yuan (US$85 million) at the Chinese box office. (7) Soaring high above Hong Kong’s box office, which grossed at HK$16.16 million (US$16.47 million), (8) Chang’s film is an early testament to the potential of co-productions in the Chinese film industry in regard to financial opportunities for both domestic and foreign directors. Additionally, the film became so influential that it triggered a genre of imitators, propelling martial arts cinema onto the global stage, while transforming the antiqued Shaolin Monastery into a major tourist attraction. (9) The film’s enormous popularity demonstrated the possibility of Chinese cultural products to become significant economic drivers.

However, not all co-productions went as smoothly or successfully as Shaolin Temple. In 1993, Tian Zhuangzhuang’s The Blue Kite was banned from all public screening in China due to its controversial topics. (10) The ban was likely caused by Tian’s portrayal of the dangers of blind patriotism during the Cultural Revolution. Despite its success abroad, winning best actress and best film at the Tokyo International Film Festival, The Blue Kite, and its director, faced heavy censorship regulations in its domestic market. A year later, Tian would resign from the Beijing Film Studio and remain on a ten-year probation on filmmaking in China. (11) Similarly, Chen Kaige’s Farewell My Concubine was taken off the screens for its depiction of homosexuality, while Zhang Yimou’s To Live was censored due to its critical portrayal of political upheavals in the prior decades. The silencing of these films serves as a stark reminder to directors about the consequences of diverging too far from the CCP’s regulatory framework.

Censorship laws also affected imported foreign films. Notably, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) banned Disney’s Kundun (1997), a biographical film directed by Martin Scorsese on the 14th Dalai Lama. By highlighting the Dalai Lama’s exile and his advocacy for Tibetan autonomy, Kundun was seen as a direct challenge to the Chinese government’s stance on Tibet. The PRC’s backlash was thus quick and severe. ''We are resolutely opposed to the making of this movie,'' said Kong Min, an official at the Film Bureau of the Ministry of Radio Film and Television. ''It is intended to glorify the Dalai Lama, so it is an interference in China's internal affairs.'' (12) Not only was Kundun banned, but the government also halted all business dealings with Disney. (13) An official statement combines dogmatic outrage with bruised emotions: “Taking up Tibet and human rights issues, those films viciously attack China and hurt Chinese people’s feelings....” the edict said. “We must maintain sharp vigilance.” (14)

While Deng’s reform policies marked a shift in the Chinese film industry from a state-welfare model to a more market-driven approach, the PRC’s responses to these “anti-nationalist” productions continue to reflect its understanding of cinema as a tool for maintaining public order—an awareness rooted in pre-Maoist China. It is here that a new genre began to emerge in Chinese cinema: “main melody” films. Where Scar cinema focused on the tragedies suffered by common civilians during the turbulent decades of war and socio-political turmoil, “main melody” films would shift the focus towards the ordeals of high-ranking CCP officers during this time. Films in this genre would seek to promote national pride, glorify CCP leadership, the party, and the Chinese military.

To understand the CCP’s stringent censorship policies, we must consider China’s modern history and the socio-political dynamics shaping its film industry. Historically, high-ranking CCP officers were absent from nationalist cinema until after the Cultural Revolution, which had plunged Chinese society into chaos. (15) In the aftermath, “main melody” films emerged to rebuild public confidence in the CCP, portraying leaders as both skilled politicians and relatable figures. (16) A notable example is Mao Zedong and His Son (1991), which humanises Mao by depicting his struggle between work and the grief of his eldest son, who was killed in the Korean War. The use of cinema to restore social order and legitimize the Party reflects the CCP’s broader ideological objectives.17 Additionally, China’s “Century of Humiliation”—marked by foreign invasions and humanitarian tragedies such as the Nanjing Massacre—had shaped a collective national identity rooted in guó chǐ (national humiliation). As China opened its economy to the West, content regulation became a tool to foster cultural confidence and project unity.18 However, by 1990, the dominance of party-line melody films failed to captivate audiences’ interest, which led to a “colossal” financial crisis in the industry, according to officials.19 Thus, to succeed in this market, directors must navigate a delicate balance: adhering to state regulations to avoid censorship, while creating content that resonates with audiences both culturally and creatively.

20th Century Fox’s Titanic (1997) is an exemplary case of the potential of the Chinese film market when a director successfully navigates this delicate balance. James Cameron’s disaster epic broke all records on its initial release in April 1998, grossing 359,500,000 yuan (US$ 44,000,000) in China. (20) Not only was Cameron’s masterpiece, its industry-pushing visual effects and sentimental cinema, loved by the Chinese public, but it also received a significant endorsement: President Jiang publicly praised the picture and urged China’s politburo to watch the historical blockbuster. (21) In good Socialist conscience, Titanic portrays the rich as villains and the poor as heroes: “This movie shows fully how people deal with the relationship between love, poverty and wealth, in the middle of a difficult situation,” said Jiang. (22) Despite the bureaucratic complications faced by the directors and studios of Kundun, Farewell My Concubine, To Live, and The Blue Kite, the exceptional success of Titanic confirmed the potential of China’s film market. Moving into the 21st century, China would now consider joining the World Trade Organisation.

MAIN MELODY BLOCKBUSTERS: 2000s-Present

China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 marked a pivotal moment for its film industry, sparking significant policy shifts like Document 342. This policy facilitated cultural and commercial exchanges with Hollywood by increasing foreign film imports from 13 to 20 annually under a revenue-sharing model. (23) The 2000s saw the rise of co-productions, where directors navigated state regulations while using them for geocentric marketing. A prime example is Kung Fu Panda (2008), a co-production between DreamWorks and Oriental DreamWorks. By incorporating cultural elements such as the Qingcheng mountains and dandan noodles, DreamWorks tailored the film to appeal to Chinese audiences, while the stardom cast attracted viewers across the world. Kung Fu Panda 3 (2016) went further, with a Chinese version reanimated to perfectly sync facial expressions with dubbed Mandarin dialogue—a first for Hollywood. (24) This collaboration illustrates the growing importance of joint ventures and international partnerships in China’s rapidly expanding film industry, which, by 2012, had become the second largest in the world, just behind Hollywood. (25)

The 21st century has seen a transformative evolution of the Chinese film industry, both in its commercial success, and creative milestones. Notably, main melody films became main melody blockbusters, combining grand visuals with state messaging. The influence of Hollywood is evident in the spectacle and action-driven narratives seen in these contemporary main melody films. Wu Jing’s Wolf Warrior 2 (2017), with its display of Chinese militaristic pride and patriotism, grossed over 854 million yuan domestically (US$ 118 million). (26) Similarly, The Battle at Lake Changjin (2021), which focuses on China’s involvement in the Korean War, grossed nearly 900 million yuan (US$124 million). (27) Such films underscore the country’s desire to present itself as a global superpower in the 21st century, capable of standing up to foreign adversaries.

Wolf Warrior 2 was hailed by the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the CCP. (28) The film follows a former Chinese special forces soldier, Leng Fen, as he seeks to rescue the locals of an unnamed African country from a group of mercenaries led by a ruthless American antagonist, Big Daddy. The film’s apparent portrayal of China as a “good foreigner” who helps the Africans ward off the “bad foreigners” from America is a clear indication to China’s new ideology about its place in the world. (29) The BBC’s Beijing Bureau interpreted the domestic prosperity of Wolf Warrior 2 as both a reflection and a by-product of the rising nationalist fervour among Chinese audiences. (30) For domestic and foreign directors seeking commercial success in the Chinese film market, this film hints at the demands of the Chinese general public, suggesting the combination of aesthetic extravaganza and nationalist themes may be a winning formula.

However, it is undeniable that distribution regulations have also played a major role in the domestic success of Chinese films with nationalist themes. When Cameron’s Avatar was released in China in 2010, the film proved wildly popular, pulling in US$76 million in ticket sales. (31) Nevertheless, the film was removed from many of the PRC’s screens. (32) The official report stated that this was to make way for a domestically produced biograph, Confucius, a main melody film directed by Hu Mei, and featured Chow Yun-fat as the renowned philosopher who shaped the cultural, and moral foundations of many eastern countries. (33) The control of distribution is one of several mechanism used by the SARFT and state-own enterprises to influence the box office success of domestically produced films.

While “main melody” films have historically been seen as vehicles for promoting Party ideology, their scope has evolved significantly over the years. Chinese sci-fi have also taken the domestic market by storm. The Wandering Earth 2 (2023), directed by Frant Gwo and a prequel to The Wandering Earth (2019), is set in a distant future where the sun is dying and engulfing the inner solar system, and nations must unite to ensure humanity’s survival through a daring plan: building colossal thrusters on the Earth’s surface to thrust the planet out of the solar system, while people live in underground cities. These films are not only box office hits but also cultural touchstones, representing a new wave of Chinese cinema that blends nationalistic narratives with global genres.

Frant Gwo’s The Wandering Earth series is a historical landmark in Chinese sci-fi cinema. The Wandering Earth 2grossed 2.9 billion Yuan (US$400 million) within its first 11 days of release, breaking 36 records and achieving 91 milestones in Chinese cinematic history. (34) Empowered by stunning visual effects and Gwo’s wild imagination, the film delivers breathtaking spectacles full of drone swarm battles, space elevators, and massive spaceships. (35) Inspired by Hollywood sci-fi blockbusters like Terminator 2 (1991), Gwo has long studied the genre, preparing to craft a unique Chinese sci-fi aesthetic. (36) To avoid alienation, Gwo developed an aesthetic design distinct from Hollywood, stating, “we had to look for elements that Chinese audiences would feel comfortable with.” (37) Settling on a Russian aesthetic in the heavy mechanics of the film’s interstellar technologies, the Wandering Earth franchise reflects an increasing demand among Chinese audiences for both culturally resonant and visually grand narratives. (38)

Beyond the screen, the series reflects a collective spirit that drives Chinese cinema. Despite receiving no direct government subsidies, Gwo secured support from private companies and individuals. XCMG Machinery contributed 319 staff and machinery, dubbing their involvement as “powering up Chinese sci-fi with love.” (39) Actor Wu Jing initially joined as a guest celebrity, but shortly took on the lead role in the second movie, investing 60 million yuan (US$8.85 million) to the project himself. (40) These contributions kept production costs relatively low, at 600 million yuan (US$88 million), surprising audiences given the film’s visual grandeur. (41) Rooted in Chinese cultural values of synergy and continuity, the series distinguishes itself from Hollywood’s sci-fi narratives. Gwo replies in an interview in the Hollywood Reporter:

When the Earth experiences this kind of crisis in Hollywood films, the hero always ventures out into space to find a new home, which is a very American approach — adventure, individualism. But in my film, we work as a team to take the whole Earth with us. This comes from Chinese cultural values — homeland, history and continuity. (42) The franchise’s success reflects the collective contribution and commitment of private studios and individuals in the Chinese film industry to creating ground-breaking domestic productions that rival Hollywood’s productions.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CREATORS OF THE INDUSTRY MOVING FORWARD

A director’s success in the Chinese film industry boils down to three key variables: (1) state regulation, (2) cultural sensibility, and (3) cinematic quality. A balance between all three have led to major successes like Cameron’s Titanic(1998), DreamWorks’ Kung Fu Panda (2009), and Gwo’s The Wandering Earth 2 (2023). As for trade barriers, with Trump back in office for 2024, and the Trade War continuing between China and the US, quotas and tariffs aren’t likely to loosen. This will continue to prove a challenge to Hollywood studios looking to fulfil the potential of the Chinese film market.

In 2021, the China Film Administration’s five-year plan outlined substantial state investments in the domestic film industry. (43) These investments include: the projection of 50 domestic productions to achieve 100 million yuan (US$15.7 million) each, annually; box offices aim to pull more than 55% of annual gross from domestic productions; raise the number of domestic movie screens to 100,000 by 2025, and more. (44) Yin Hong, vice-chairman of the China Film Association, said the plan is an objective judgement based on the rapid growth of Chinese cinema over the last 20 years. (45) "Chinese films ranked in the top level should be more thought-provoking, diversified and creative to exert a bigger influence to draw a bigger overseas audience," he added. (46) Whether the CCP’s push to foster domestic productions is primarily a political strategy aimed at reinforcing social order—particularly amid ongoing tensions in Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Xinjiang—remains a topic deserving of rigorous discussion.

That said, since the 1970s, Chinese cinema has evolved beyond its role as a political tool to become a significant cultural touchstone. With influential filmmakers like Zhang Kaige, Zhang Yimou, and Frant Gwo driving its narrative, Chinese cinema now reflects and shapes cultural identity. Ultimately, I believe Chinese filmmaking is joining the ranks of historical art forms such as music, literature, and architecture, serving as a modern medium for storytelling and cultural expression in China’s rich artistic tradition.

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